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Introduction
Despite it being a rather turbulent year with parliamentary elections on the calendar,
2018 did not turn around the major trends of the Hungarian political sphere: the
governing Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Union-Christian-Democratic People’s Party/Fidesz
Magyar Polgári Szövetség-Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt (Fidesz-KDNP) maintained its
political dominance while the opposition parties further disintegrated, the media landscape
became even more centralized, and immigration and anti-European issues dominated the
agenda scattered with corruption scandals and demonstrations.
Election report
Parliamentary elections
The first half of 2018 was dominated by a highly adversarial electoral campaign where the
governing parties focused on anti-immigration messages and on the plans of George Soros.
These messages were amplified by the government which financed public advertisements
blurring the lines of campaign financing, and also by the public broadcaster that leaned
towards the government in its coverage. In the meantime, opposition parties came short of
an effective message to address the public. The left-wing parties competed for leadership
of the opposition, while the leader of the radical right-wing Movement for a Better
Hungary/Jobbik Magyarországért (Jobbik) Gábor Vona relentlessly pushed the party
towards the centre-right with the support of the ex-Fidesz oligarch and media mogul, Lajos
Simicska.
Owing to a lack of cooperation between them, opposition parties ran separate party
lists, except for the MSZP-PM joint list, and consequently struggled with the need for
cooperation in the single-member district (SMD) elections throughout the campaign. The
Hungarian electoral system is a mixed system with 93 mandates distributed on party lists
and 103 mandates in SMDs, thus the majoritarian element is critical to electoral success.
Recognizing the lack of political commitment to coordinated candidate selection, there were
many civil initiatives to identify the strongest opposition candidate in the SMDs and enable
tactical voting, but without a clear message from parties these attempts were unsuccessful
in changing the outcome of the elections.
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Table 1. Elections to Parliament (Magyar Országgyu˝lés) in Hungary in 2018
Date of election 8 April 2018 Previous election 6 April 2014
Electorate 8,312,264 Total seats 199
Total votes cast 5,791,868 Turnout 69.7%
Valid votes cast 5,732,283 Share of valid vote 98.97%
Votes Seats
Party N % % N % N %
Fidesz-Hungarian Civic
Union-Christian-Democratic People’s
Party/Fidesz Magyar Polgári
Szövetség-Kereszténydemokrata
Néppárt (Fidesz-KDNP)
2,824,551 49.6% +4.6% 133 66.8% 0 0%
Movement for a Better Hungary/Jobbik
Magyarországért (Jobbik)
1,092,806 19.2% −1.1% 26 13.1% +3 +1.5%
Hungarian Socialist Party-Dialogue for
Hungary/Magyar Szocialista
Párt-Párbeszéd Magyarországért
(MSZP-PM)
682,701 11.9% −13.7%a 20 10.1% −10 −5%
Politics Can Be Different/Lehet Más a
Politika (LMP)
404,429 7.1% −1.7% 8 4.0% +3 +2%
Democratic Coalition/Demokratikus
Koalíció (DK)
308,161 5.4% n.a.
a
9 4.5% +5b +2.5%b
Together-Party for a New Era/Együtt-a
Korszakváltók Pártja (Együtt)
37,562 0.7% n.a.
a
1 0.5% −3b −1.5%b
National Self-Government on Germans
in Hungary/Magyarországi Németek
Országos Önkormányzata (MNÖO)
26,477 0.46% +0.2% 1 0.5% +1 +0.5%
Independent – – – 1
c
0.50% +1 +0.5%
Notes: aAt the previous election in 2014, the MSZP had a joint list with Együtt-DK-PM-MPL and together
they reached 25.67% of party lists votes, while in 2018 the MSZP had a joint list with only PM. The
comparison in list votes and seats is only presented for MSZP-PM.
bThe party did not have a PPG in the previous cycle; the change is compared with the number of MPs
identifying with the given party.
cPreferential mandate won on ethnic minority party list.
Source: National Election Office, 2018.
Preceding the elections, a strong mobilization campaign took place on behalf of the
opposition with the hope of reaching out to discontented voters. Indeed, turnout almost
amounted to 70 per cent at the elections. Yet, the election results showed that in rural
areas the government parties were more successful in their mobilization efforts, resulting
in a landslide victory for the governing Fidesz-KDNP coalition that regained its qualified
majority in Parliament. While according to the ODHIR (2018) report on the election, the
process itself was free and well managed and voters could choose from various political
alternatives, the media coverage was rather biased, hindering balanced access to political
information.
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Cabinet and Parliament report
The Orbán IV government cannot be regarded as a simple continuation of the Orbán III
government as many prominent politicians and ministers (such as Istán Lázár, Minister of
the PrimeMinister’s Office, and Lajos Kósa, founder of Fidesz) left the political arena.With
the weakened presence of the KDNP in the coalition, it is safe to predict that Viktor Orbán
intends to lead a highly disciplined and centralized governmental structure.
Regarding the composition of Parliament, it is clear that the opposition does not have
the potential to act as a check upon the government. The opposition is fractionalized, which
is mirrored in its relatively high number of small parliamentary groups and the occurrence
of opposition party splits which have resulted in an increase in the number of independent
MPs who are even more powerless than factions.
Table 2. Cabinet composition of Orbán III in Hungary in 2018
Duration of Cabinet Inception 6 June 2014 Dissolution 6 May 2018
Period covered by table From 1 January 2018 Until 6 May 2018
Type of Cabinet Oversized coalition (OC)
A. Party/gender composition on
1 January 2018
Seats in Cabinet Seats held by
women
Seats in Parliament
N % N % of party N %
Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Union/
Fidesz Magyar Polgári
Szövetség (Fidesz)
6 46.1% 0 0% 114 57.3%
Christian-Democratic People’s
Party/Kereszténydemokrata
Néppárt (KDNP)
4 30.8% 0 0% 17 8.5%
No party affiliation 3 23.1% 0 0% 0 0%
Totals 13 100% 0 0% 131 65.8%
B. Composition of Orbán III Cabinet on 1 January 2018
See previous editions of the Political Data Yearbook for Hungary or
http://politicaldatayearbook.com
C. Changes in composition of Orbán III Cabinet during 2018
Ministerial title Outgoing minister Outgoing date Incoming minister Comments
None
D. Party/gender composition on
6 May 2018
Seats in Cabinet Seats held by
women
Seats in Parliament
N % N % of party N %
No change during 2018
Source: Hungarian government, 2018 (www.kormany.hu).
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Table 3. Cabinet composition of Orbán IV in Hungary in 2018
Duration of Cabinet Inception 18 May 2018
a
Dissolution Still in office at the
end of the year
Period covered by table From 18 May 2018 Until 31 December 2018
Type of Cabinet Oversized coalition (OC)
A. Party/gender composition on
1 January 2018
Seats in Cabinet Seats held by
women
Seats in Parliament
N % N % of party N %
Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Union
(Fidesz)
6 46.2% 0 0% 114 57.3%
Christian-Democratic People’s
Party (KDNP)
4 30.7% 0 0% 17 8.5%
No party affiliation 3 23.1% 0 0% 0 0%
Totals 13 100% 0 0% 131 65.8%
B. Composition of Orbán IV Cabinet on 18 May 2018
Ministerial title Minister
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán (1963, male, Fidesz)
Deputy Prime Minister for Hungarian
Communities
Zsolt Semjén (1962, male, KDNP)
Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Finance Mihály Varga (1965, male, Fidesz)
Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Interior Sándor Pintér (1968, male Fidesz)
Head of the Cabinet of the Prime Minister Antal Rogán (1972, male, Fidesz)
Minister of the Prime Minister’s Office Gergely Gulyás (1981, male, Fidesz)
Minister of Human Capacities Miklós Kásler (1950, male, non-partisan)
Minister of Agriculture István Nagy (1967, male, Fidesz)
Minister for Innovation and Technology
(Innovációs és Technológiai Minisztérium)
László Palkovics (1965, male, non-partisan)
Minister of Justice László Trocsányi (1956, male, non-partisan)
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Péter Szijjártó (1978, male, Fidesz)
Minister of Defense Tibor Benko˝ (1955, male, non-partisan)
Minister without Portfolio János Süli (1956, male, KDNP)
Minister without Portfolio Andrea Bárfai-Mager (no data, female,
non-partisan)
C. Changes in composition of Orbán IV Cabinet during 2018
Ministerial title Outgoing minister Outgoing date Incoming minister Comments
None
D. Party/gender composition
on 31 December 2018
Seats in Cabinet Seats held by
women
Seats in Parliament
N % N % of party N %
No change after 18 May 2018
Note: aBetween 6 and 18 May, the government functioned as a caretaker government.
Source: Hungarian government, 2018 (www.kormany.hu).
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Table 4. Party and gender composition Parliament (Magyar Országgyu˝lés) in Hungary in 2018
1 January 2018 April 2018, elections 31 December 2018
All Women All Women All Women
Party N % N % N % N % N % N %
Fidesz-Hungarian Civic
Union (Fidesz)
114 57.3% 8 7.0% 117 58.8% 10 8.5% 116 58.6% 10 8.6%
Movement for a Better
Hungary (Jobbik)
24 12.1% 2 8.3% 26 13.1% 3 11.5% 21 10.6% 2 9.5%
Christian-Democratic
People’s Party (KDNP)
17 8.5% 1 5.9% 16 8.0% 1 6.2% 16
a
8.1% 1 6.25%
Hungarian Socialist
Party/Magyar Szocialista
Párt (MSZP)
28 14.1% 3 10.7% 15 7.6% 3 0.2% 15 7.6% 3 0.2%
Politics Can Be Different
(LMP)
6 3% 3 50% 10
b
4.5% 3 0.3% 6 3.1% 2 33.3%
Democratic Coalition (DK) 0 0% 0 0% 9 4.5% 1 11.1% 9 4.5% 1 11.1%
Dialogue for
Hungary/Párbeszéd
Magyarországért (PM)
0 0% 0 0% 5 2.5% 2 0.45% 5 2.5% 1 0.2%
Member from nationality list 0 0% 0 0% 1 0.5% 0 0% 1 0.5% 0 0%
Independents
a
10 5.0% 3 30% 1 0.5% 0 0% 9 4.5% 3 3.33%
Totals 199 100% 20 10% 199 100% 23 11.6% 198 100 23 11.6%
Notes: aOne MP of Fidesz (Ferenc Hirt) deceased in December 2018 and his place was only taken by a
KDNPMP (István Hollik) in February 2019. Thus, the total number of MPs was 198 on 31 December 2018.
bSzabolcs Szabó, who won a mandate as a candidate of Együtt, joined the PPG of LMP upon entering
Parliament.
Source: Hungarian Parliament, 2018 (www.parlament.hu).
Political party report
The opposition parties faced many external and internal challenges throughout the year.At
the beginning of 2018, the State Audit Office imposed fines on several opposition parties
for accepting illegal party financing. Although the payment deadline was postponed to
a post-election date, it put further pressure on parties to run the maximum number of
candidates in order to access campaign funds. After the election, smaller opposition parties
such as the Together-Party for a New Era/Együtt-a Korszakváltók Pártja (Együtt) collapsed
under the financial pressure, and while some started crowdfunding initiatives to be able to
cover their expenses, it became clear that only parliamentary parties could sustain their
activities.
The issue of the strategic withdrawal of candidates in SMDs affected opposition
parties well beyond the election date. In April, the ethical committee of Politics Can Be
Different/Lehet Más a Politika (LMP) launched a series of investigations against the party
leaders’ decision to withdraw candidates based on the claim that the action was opposed
to the party’s official stance. As a result, Ákos Hadházy, who stepped back from his co-
president post right after the election, and Bernadett Szél, co-president of the party at the
time, were barred from holding party positions. With several other members affected, the
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Table 5. Changes in political parties in Hungary in 2018
A. Party institutional changes in 2018
Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) split after László Torockai, Mayor of Ásotthalom, was
banned from the party on 6 June, followed by several founding members who later decided to
found a new party (see below)
Our Homeland Movement/AMi Hazánk Mozgalom was founded on 20 August
B. Party leadership changes in 2018
LMP, party co-president Ákos Hadházy (1974, male, LMP) resigned after the defeat at the
parliamentary elections; replaced by László Keresztes (1975, male, LMP) on 25 May
LMP, party co-president Bernadett Szél (1977, female, LMP) resigned from the presidency on 21
August; replaced by Márta Demeter (1983, female, LMP) on 20 October
Jobbik party president Gábor Vona (1978, male, Jobbik) resigned after losing the parliamentary
elections on 9 April; replaced by Tamás Sneider (1972, male, Jobbik)
Our Homeland Movement party president László Torockai (1978, male, Our Homeland
Movement) became founding president of the new party Our Homeland Movement on 23 June
MSZP party president Gyula Molnár (1961, male, MSZP) resigned after the defeat at the
parliamentary elections; replaced by Bertalan Tóth (1975, male, MSZP) on 17 June
Source: Hungarian News Agency (MTI), 2018 (www.mti.hu).
disintegration of the party became apparent and several MPs quit the LMP’s parliamentary
party group, while Tamás Meszerics, Member of the European Parliament, also withdrew
from the party.
The biggest opposition party, Jobbik,which received the highest fine of roughly €360,000,
also faced crucial internal debates after Gábor Vona, leader of the party, resigned. Conflicts
about the party’s ideological shift towards the centre-right and political strategy regarding
cooperation with other opposition parties resurfaced and split the party base and its
leadership.
After the election of the new party leader,Tamás Sneider,his challenger,László Torockai,
established a new organization after leaving Jobbik followed by other prominent party
members resulting in the split of the party’s parliamentary party group.Under the leadership
of Torockai, who is the Major of Ásotthalom and famous for the organization of a local
paramilitary organization (Betyársereg), a new political movement called Our Homeland
Movement/AMi Hazánk Mozgalom was founded on 20 August, aiming at returning to the
original radical political roots.
After the electoral defeat, theHungarian Socialist Party/Magyar Szocialista Párt (MSZP)
saw a leadership change as well, since Gyula Molnár and the entire party board resigned.
After a highly contested election between former party leader Attila Mesterházy and the
parliamentary party group leader, Bertalan Tóth, Tóth emerged as the winner.
Institutional change report
The most significant institutional change occurred in June when the seventh amendment
of the Hungarian Basic Law was passed, paving the way for further institutional changes
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such as the set-up of a two-level administrative court system with courts addressing first-
instance cases and an Administrative Supreme Court having the same status as the Curia,
the highest judicial authority in Hungary, which examines appeals submitted against the
decisions of the regional courts and reviews final decisions in case they are challenged
through an extraordinary remedy. The administrative courts that will start running in 2020
will be ruling in cases concerning administrative regulations by Hungarian authorities such
as taxes, construction permits and the disclosure of public interest data. The new system
has been highly criticized owing to its dependence on the Minister of Justice who will be in
charge of appointing the judges of the new court.The amendment of the Basic Law included
other highly controversial legislation regarding the living condition of the homeless who
were banned from sleeping in the streets, resulting in the criminalization of homelessness,
and provisions regarding immigration stating that ‘no alien population shall be settled in
Hungary’.
The amendment was closely related to the government-sponsored legislative package
consisting of three bills called ‘Stop Soros’ which was designed allegedly to fight
organizations supporting illegal immigration. Based on the new regulation, organizations
supported from abroad must register and account for their activities and pay special
immigration financing duties on benefits originating from abroad.The package also includes
the establishment of a new crime category consisting of supporting and promoting illegal
immigration.
While not strictly of a legal nature, the reshaping of the Hungarian media landscape
was a game-changer in many ways in Hungary. After the fallout with Orbán in 2017, the
fate of Lajos Simicska’s right-wing media conglomerate, including a television station,
print and online media outlets and radio channels, was financially and political unstable.
While some items such as the right-wing newspapers Magyar Nemzet and Heti Válasz
were suspended, others such as the news channel Hír TV were taken over by pro-
government owners after the election. In order to manage the diverse media portfolio
efficiently and securely, a new conglomerate was established in November 2018 when the
oligarch Lo˝rincz Mészáros donated his media company shares to the Central European
Press and Media Foundation. The foundation soon acquired the ownership of several
other media outlets including notorious right-wing publications such as Figyelo˝, the daily
circulated free local newspaper Lokál and the most read online news website Origo. While
the move seems a business transaction, nevertheless the merger allows the foundation
to control almost 500 media outlets and reach out to the vast majority of Hungarian
voters.
Issues in national politics
After the election, the Fidesz-KDNP government was keen to keep immigration on the
agenda. While the negative campaign’s flagship was the Stop Soros package discussed
above, a more positive, solution-based approach was also needed. Subsequently, one of
Fidesz’s most prominent policies, its generous system of family-friendly state subsidies,
became reframed as an alternative solution to the European demographic problem.
Following up on earlier similar endeavours, the National Consultation on Families was
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launched in November with the first question being: ‘Do you agree that the population
decline should be tackled not by immigration but by stronger support for families?’
Based on the results, the government promised to implement a system with further
increased subsidies designed to boost Hungarian demographics in the long-run. Note that
while the system indeed offers generous support to families, most of these policies are
dependent upon the families’ willingness to raise children and targets middle- to upper-class
families.
Another prominent political issue is connected to education and research. The ongoing
negotiations between the Central EuropeanUniversity (CEU) and the government came to
a halt when,upon reaching the self-proclaimed deadline of 1December without a consensus,
the CEU decided to take most of its activities to Vienna. While some of its educational
programmes accredited in Hungary stay in Budapest, the Vienna campus would host most
of the staff and of many of its in-coming students.
Aside from the CEU, the academic sphere witnessed other major conflicts in 2018. First
the government removed gender studies from the list of approved master’s programmes in
the summer of 2018, resulting in protest mainly fromHungarian and international academic
circles. A more visible conflict erupted when a new legislative draft was presented shifting
half of the Hungarian Academy of Science’s (MTA) budget to the Ministry of Innovation
and Technology.The proposed restructuring endangered the financial stability and academic
autonomy of the MTA and its network of research institutions, thus the academy resisted
and engaged in an ongoing debate about proposed reforms. The academy agreed to audit
its research network and presented a strategic proposal for the revision, but it demanded
autonomous access to its budget (HAS, 2018). The debate did not reach a conclusion, with
a decision expected in the first half of 2019.
While both theCEUand theMTAconflicts prompted civil protest, it was the amendment
to the Labour Law raising the limit of yearly overtime that received the most public
attention in 2018. The parliamentary process of the bill was already out of the ordinary as
opposition MPs tried for obstruction through the introduction of a series of amendments,
then physically blocked the Speaker’s podium to prevent voting, and used billboards, sirens
and whistles to interrupt the session. After the bill was passed, the opposition continued its
protest outside Parliament, culminating in a series of civil demonstrations against the so-
called ‘Slave Law’. According to analysts, the events were extraordinary as they prompted
an unexpected unity among opposition MPs and enabled them to formulate a message that
resonated with the public (Policy Solutions 2019).
Hungarian political developments triggered international attention from various
organizations (such as the Venice Commission and the Hungarian Helsinki Committee) as
well as the European Parliament, which voted to initiate the Article 7 procedure against
Hungary in September. The resulting Sargentini report was highly critical of the Orbán
government, citing restriction of the press and threats to the independence of the judiciary,
among other claims. While the government rejected most of the allegations and refused
to implement the proposed changes, Orbán pointed out that the question of immigration
induces rupture in the European People’s Party and criticized the party for taking sides
with the Socialists and Liberals on this issue. With the upcoming European parliamentary
elections, these conflicts in the European political arena are expected to gain further
momentum in 2019.
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